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The discovery of oil and natural-gas reserves in the Middle East at the beginning of the twentieth century changed the fate of the 
region. From a backwater of international 
politics, the Middle East became central 
to international strategic rivalries. Almost 
a century later, energy discoveries in the 
Eastern Mediterranean are unlikely to 
bring about such tectonic shifts in the stra-
tegic fortunes of the Levant. Yet they have 
generated a fresh interest in their potential 
impact on existing regional disputes and 
power constellations.
 The recent discovery of sizable quanti-
ties of natural gas in the seabed between 
Israel and Cyprus has added to the com-
plexity of international politics in the 
region. Cyprus and Israel are expected to 
be the first two states to benefit, as they 
have already signed large contracts for 
exploration and drilling projects that would 
soon turn them into net energy export-
ers. The possibility of discovering further 
energy reserves has revived the question of 
delineating the exclusive economic zones 
(EEZs) of all littoral states in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and added one potential 
regional dispute. Turkey’s role has been 
important, not only because it is one of the 
region’s littoral states and a large energy 
importer, but also because it could serve as 
a transport hub for the delivery of ex-
tracted hydrocarbons to the world market. 
Nevertheless, the Cyprus question, dis-
putes over the delineation of the EEZ and 
Turkey’s frozen relations with Israel have 
deterred regional cooperation, despite the 
positive effect that it could have, not least 
for European energy security.1
RELATIVE VS. ABSOLUTE GAINS
 Will the energy bounty contribute to an 
escalation of bilateral conflict or eventually 
lead to cooperation that could have a cru-
cial positive spillover effect on longstand-
ing regional disputes? The energy bounty 
has the potential to lure some actors to take 
more obstinate positions in their bilat-
eral conflicts. On the other hand, it may 
contribute to the emergence of economic 
synergies that render existing conflicts 
irrelevant. The prospect of cooperation in 
the field of energy adds an extra dimen-
sion to longstanding international disputes 
and can be considered a trigger for further 
cooperation. In line with Duncan Snidal’s 
argument, this study argues that the inclu-
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discovery of the Aphrodite natural-gas 
field by Noble Energy, a company already 
operating in Israel, within the EEZ of 
Cyprus triggered major policy develop-
ments and attracted global attention. It was 
speculated that this was the harbinger of 
the discovery of even larger reserves in 
the Eastern Mediterranean.9 As the pro-
duction from the Tamar natural-gas field 
was launched in 2013 and the beginning 
of production from the larger Leviathan 
field was expected in the following years, 
the question of how to monetize the Israeli 
natural-gas output became pertinent. The 
first sign of Cypriot-Israeli energy coop-
eration occurred when the Israeli company 
Delek became a partner in the consortium 
developing the Aphrodite field. Mean-
while, the Republic of Cyprus in January 
2012 auctioned additional plots to several 
leading energy companies. Opening the 
exploration and extraction operations to 
a multitude of international investors was 
meant to reinforce the political viability of 
the project. Despite Turkey’s opposition 
and threats to blacklist the companies that 
participated in the public tender, major in-
ternational energy companies such as Total 
and ENI participated and won tenders.
 From a diplomatic perspective, it was 
hoped that cooperation among Cyprus, 
Greece and Israel would consolidate an 
emerging strategic partnership.10 On the 
other hand, uncertainty about the size of 
the natural-gas fields had a major impact 
on project discussions. The options that ex-
cluded Turkey required a substantial mini-
mum quantity of marketable natural-gas 
volumes in order to become economically 
feasible. The size of the energy reserves 
could be critical for monetizing Cypriot 
energy resources. While the interest of the 
United States in the development of the 
Eastern Mediterranean energy sector was 
sion of several international actors — the 
multilateralization of the monetization 
project of energy resources in the Eastern 
Mediterranean on both demand and sup-
ply sides — is likely to render emphasis 
on relative gains counterproductive.2 It 
could eventually lead to a configuration of 
national interests closer to “absolute gains” 
approaches.3 Hence, seeking a solution that 
would include the core parties of Cyprus, 
Israel, Greece and Turkey — and in prin-
ciple remain open to the eventual inclusion 
of Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority and 
Syria — would be the best policy option.
A CHANGING STRATEGIC 
GEOMETRY
 As some modest discoveries, known 
as Yam Tethys, off Israel’s Mediterranean 
shore decades ago had only a minor influ-
ence on its energy autarky, Israel continued 
to be dependent on Egypt for its energy 
supplies. While Israeli-Egyptian relations 
have generally been smooth since the 1978 
Camp David accords, the risk of regime 
change in Egypt posed a formidable 
challenge to Israeli security. Natural-gas 
supply to Israel was occasionally inter-
rupted due to sabotage inside Egypt, in 
particular following the collapse of the 
Mubarak regime in 2011.4 These concerns 
were relieved with the discovery of the 
Tamar natural-gas field in 2009 and of the 
Leviathan natural-gas field in 2010 within 
the Israeli EEZ. Both discoveries became 
game changers, as they could transform 
Israeli power generation, reduce depen-
dency on crude oil5 and turn Israel from 
a net importer of energy to a prospective 
net exporter.6 This shed light on the energy 
potential of the whole Levantine basin,7 
including Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria and 
the Palestinian Territories,8 and triggered 
additional exploratory drilling. The 2011 
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to render investment in the LNG facility 
viable. While the original expectation was 
that the size of the Aphrodite field ranged 
between 3.6 and 7.6 trillion cubic feet (tcf), 
this was reduced to less than 5 tcf following 
exploratory drilling in September 2013. As 
initial optimism was trimmed and Israel ap-
peared unwilling to agree to a joint project, 
the viability of the LNG-plant investment 
became dependent on the discovery of 
additional natural gas reserves within the 
Cypriot EEZ or the commitment of sizable 
quantities of Israeli natural gas.
 While building an LNG terminal on 
Israeli soil would involve major security 
concerns, as it could become a prime target 
of a terrorist attack, making Israeli exports 
dependent on good relations with Cyprus 
was another source of anxiety for Israelis. 
Building an offshore LNG unit remained a 
possibility, but at an exorbitant cost. A sec-
ond alternative was the construction of a 
pipeline from Israel via Cyprus to Turkey, 
economically the most viable option, given 
the relatively limited amount of investment 
required. Turkey had already developed a 
comprehensive pipeline network, so access 
to European markets would be facili-
tated. In Turkey, the natural gas would be 
transported through the existing network to 
European markets or consumed in Turkey, 
itself a sizable natural-gas importer. Tur-
key had already built pipeline connections 
with key natural-gas exporters, such as 
Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran, and additional 
projects had been negotiated with its Arab 
neighbors. Israeli and Cypriot gas could 
support the feasibility of additional pipe-
line projects, which were having difficulty 
in securing sufficient volumes of gas. 
On the other hand, such a project could 
hardly bear fruit without the resolution of 
the decades-long Cyprus problem and the 
establishment of a bizonal, bicommunal 
obvious,11 different strategic views were 
juxtaposed. Some viewed the discovery 
of natural gas as a windfall opportunity to 
change the strategic calculus of the Cyprus 
question and corner Turkey and advocated 
a new security order in the Eastern Medi-
terranean.12 Others considered the prospec-
tive natural-gas wealth as an opportunity 
to build interdependent links and fund the 
inevitable cost of any negotiated settlement 
of the Cyprus question.13 As economic 
considerations were among the main rea-
sons for the rejection by the Greek Cypriot 
community of the 2004 UN Annan Plan, 
the newly discovered natural-gas fields 
could help remove such apprehensions. 
Whether economics would fall hostage to 
“high politics” or help reframe the regional 
strategic geometry remained to be seen.14
MONETIZATION OPTIONS
 Among the possible solutions sug-
gested for the monetization of the energy 
resources discovered in the Levant basin,15 
three have gained the most traction. The 
first was the development of natural-gas liq-
uefaction facilities in Israel and the Repub-
lic of Cyprus. Israel has considered build-
ing its own liquefied natural-gas (LNG) 
facility onshore or offshore or alternatively 
a joint LNG project with the Republic of 
Cyprus on Cypriot territory. The develop-
ment of an onshore LNG facility appeared 
to be the preferred option of the Cypriot 
government and several pundits.16 Build-
ing a unit at Vassilikos, near Limassol, was 
expected to provide flexibility and access to 
multiple energy markets within and outside 
the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the 
exorbitant cost of the project was one of 
the biggest hurdles, as was the securing of 
sufficient natural-gas quantities through 
either additional Cypriot discoveries or the 
commitment of enough Israeli natural gas 
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possibility of a pipeline connecting Israel 
and Turkey remained the most feasible 
one. Politics appeared to take clear prece-
dence over economics; economic coopera-
tion seemed stillborn.
THE CYPRUS QUESTION
 The Cyprus question remained the 
most serious challenge turning the natural-
gas discovery into a trigger for regional 
cooperation in the Levant. Ever since 
the 1950s, Cyprus has constituted a key 
security concern for Greece, Turkey and 
Great Britain, undermining the prospects 
of regional economic cooperation. In the 
late 1990s, the European Union became 
one of the key actors in catalyzing Greek19 
and Turkish20 perceptions of the Cyprus 
issue and supporting a compromise solu-
tion. The prospect of EU membership 
for Turkey and Cyprus in the early 2000s 
briefly raised optimism about the pos-
sibility of a breakthrough. However, the 
failure to reach an agreement in the 2004 
UN Annan Plan referendum meant that 
Cyprus’s prospects of EU membership 
would be decoupled from the resolution of 
the conflict. Post-2004 negotiations failed 
to generate any momentum, and hopes that 
a series of confidence-building measures 
(CBMs) could change the course of events 
were dashed.21 While the de facto division 
of the island posed a risk to the completion 
of any project, the legality of natural-gas 
exploration by the Republic of Cyprus was 
contested by Turkey. The rights of Turkish 
Cypriots to the energy resources discov-
ered off the southern shore of Cyprus were 
at the heart of the controversy. The Repub-
lic of Cyprus remains the sole internation-
ally recognized state on the island repre-
senting both the Greek and the Turkish 
communities; however, Turkey has refused 
to recognize the Republic of Cyprus since 
federation, according to the provisions of 
UN Security Council decisions and the 
negotiation process.
 A third option would involve the con-
struction of an underwater pipeline from 
Israel and Cyprus to Crete and from there 
to continental Greece. While this project 
would consolidate the close strategic, 
economic and cultural relations between 
Greece and Cyprus and their emerging 
partnership with Israel, its cost and techni-
cal difficulties were high. The feasibility of 
the project depended on the discovery of 
large additional natural-gas reserves in the 
Eastern Mediterranean seabed. In addi-
tion, assuming that the Cyprus issue could 
be resolved, its market rationale would be 
questionable, given that Turkey would be 
a much bigger natural-gas importer than 
Greece.17 
 The question of how to transport the 
natural gas that would be produced in the 
Israeli and Cypriot EEZs to the interna-
tional markets highlighted these contra-
dictory considerations. While building 
a pipeline to Turkey, a major regional 
consumer with the ambition to become an 
energy hub,18 appeared to be the most ra-
tional decision from an economic point of 
view, this choice faced formidable political 
obstacles: the age-old Cyprus question and 
the sharp deterioration of Turkish-Israeli 
relations over the last years. Moreover, a 
Levantine land route was precluded, given 
the animosity among Israel, Syria and 
Lebanon and the fact that the trans-Arab 
pipeline built to transport Egyptian natural 
gas to the Arab Middle East and Turkey 
was not operational following the outbreak 
of the “Arab Spring.” Alternative solutions 
were suggested, such as the construction of 
LNG facilities in Israel and Cyprus or the 
construction of undersea pipelines con-
necting Israel, Cyprus and Greece. But the 
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conducting exploration in plots that the Re-
public of Cyprus had allocated for explora-
tion but Turkey also claimed. The Republic 
of Cyprus submitted formal protests against 
these exploration activities, but Turkey 
fell short of actively obstructing Cypriot 
exploratory activities in the south.
 Meanwhile, the January 2013 election 
of Nikos Anastasiades to the presidency 
of the Republic of Cyprus raised new 
hopes for the successful resumption of 
peace talks. Anastasiades was the single 
major political-party leader to give his full 
support for the abortive UN Annan Plan 
in the 2004 referendum. While this cost 
him a great deal on the domestic front, 
it consolidated his profile as a moderate 
regarding the Cyprus question. Yet his 
rise to the presidency coincided with the 
outbreak of the Cyprus economic crisis. 
This inevitably put the Cyprus question on 
the backburner.24 As peace talks were re-
sumed in February 2014, it was hoped that 
natural gas could become a critical instru-
ment in negotiating a breakthrough.25 This 
optimism was not, however, shared by all 
observers.26
ΕΕΖ CONTROVERSY
 A spillover of the natural-gas discov-
eries off the shores of Cyprus and Israel 
has been the resuscitation of an age-old 
dispute between Greece and Turkey re-
garding the delineation of their respective 
maritime zones, territorial waters, airspace 
and continental shelf.27 The exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) is a relatively new 
item on this list.28 This is due to the fact 
that the concept acquired legal backing 
only with the signing of the UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 
1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica.29 While 
Greek-Turkish exploratory talks began 
in 1999 with the aim of establishing a 
1963 and has recognized only the “Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) 
since 1983. Nevertheless, it continues to 
claim for Turkish Cypriots the rights that 
emanate from the 1959-60 founding trea-
ties of the Republic of Cyprus. In other 
words, Ankara argues that the Republic 
of Cyprus had no right to conduct energy 
exploration and production activities off its 
southern coast without the explicit consent 
of Turkish Cypriots.22
 This position appeared to contradict 
Turkey’s refusal to recognize the Republic 
of Cyprus and by implication the validity 
of its founding treaties. Given that Turkey 
had proceeded with the recognition of the 
“TRNC” in 1983, claiming that Greek 
Cypriots had lost all sovereignty rights in 
the northern part of Cyprus, it appeared 
hard to convincingly argue that Turkish 
Cypriots maintained their sovereign rights 
in the south, in particular at the southern-
most extremity of the Cypriot EEZ in the 
Mediterranean, where the Aphrodite gas 
field is located. Nevertheless, Turkey’s op-
position raised the political risk of the proj-
ect, although it was widely believed that 
Turkey’s objections would remain verbal 
and nonviolent. 
 Meanwhile, Turkey put forward its 
own marine energy exploration program 
to contest, in practice, the Cypriot EEZ in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. 23 Following 
the September 2011 signature of a bilat-
eral agreement between Turkey and the 
“TRNC” on the delineation of their conti-
nental shelves, TPAO (Türkiye Petrolleri 
Anonim Ortaklığı), Turkey’s national 
petroleum corporation, signed in Novem-
ber 2011 a contract with the “TRNC” to 
conduct exploration in the sea between 
Turkey and Cyprus. Meanwhile, a Turkish 
maritime exploration vessel sailed off the 
southern shore of Cyprus with the aim of 
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common basis for the resolution of the 
dispute through adjudication, introduc-
ing the question of the EEZ appeared to 
be a game changer. While it is true that 
the rights emanating from the continental 
shelf and the EEZ overlap up to a point, 
there remained substantial issues to be 
resolved. As several Greek political lead-
ers and analysts argued that Greece should 
unilaterally declare its EEZ in the Aegean 
and Eastern Mediterranean30 regardless 
of Turkey’s concerns and objections, the 
prospect of a crisis in Greek-Turkish rela-
tions loomed. Meanwhile, Turkey ob-
jected to the EEZ delineation treaties that 
Cyprus had concluded with Egypt, Israel 
and Lebanon. It also claimed that the 
Greek islands of Megisti (Kastellorizo), 
Agios Georgios (Ro) and Strongyli should 
have no influence on the delineation of 
the Greek EEZ in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean. Under these circumstances, the 
prospect that the seabed of the Eastern 
Mediterranean could hold sizable energy 
reserves was expected to raise the stakes 
and complicate a mutually agreed-upon 
delineation of the EEZs in the region. 
Unilateral moves by littoral states could 
potentially lead to regional tension and 
conflict, though the prospect of referring 
the delineation to international adjudica-
tion appears dim at the moment.
ISRAELI-TURKISH RELATIONS
 Frosty relations between Israel and 
Turkey have made cooperative solutions 
on the monetization of energy resources 
in the Levant even more complicated. 
The two had enjoyed a close diplomatic 
relationship that dated from the founding 
of Israel; Turkey was one of the first to 
recognize its independence. This relation-
ship was upgraded in the mid-1990s to a 
strategic partnership that aimed to offer 
a model; an “Israeli-Turkish axis” was 
meant to constitute a new security or-
der in the Middle East.31 This trend held 
steady in the first years of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) administra-
tion, despite the expectations of many 
who pointed to the Islamist origins of the 
AKP’s leading cadres and their anti-Israeli 
sentiments. Turkey was keen to mediate 
the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the 
Golan Heights and achieve conflict resolu-
tion between Israel and Syria. Yet the fail-
ure of the Golan Heights peace initiative 
in spring 2008 and Israel’s Operation Cast 
Lead, in 2008-09 in Gaza had a deleteri-
ous effect on bilateral relations.
 Following the January 2009 public 
clash between Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan and President Shimon 
Peres at the Davos World Economic Fo-
rum, the Gaza flotilla incident brought the 
relationship to its lowest level. The Israeli 
armed forces intercepted the Mavi Mar-
mara, a Turkish vessel carrying activists 
with humanitarian aid for Gaza, in defi-
ance of the Israel embargo, killing 10 of 
its passengers. The public outcry caused 
both countries to withdraw their ambas-
sadors. Relations remained at rock bottom 
for years, as Turkey demanded an official 
apology and monetary compensation for 
the victims. Only due to the strong per-
sonal involvement of President Barack 
Obama did Israeli Prime Minister Benja-
min Netanyahu apologize in March 2013 
to Erdoğan for the loss of Turkish lives. 
Yet even this apology was not sufficient to 
thaw the ice, and the compensation issue 
was not resolved. Bashing the other side 
served the domestic political agendas of 
Erdogan and Netanyahu despite the poten-
tial benefits of cooperation in monetizing 
the energy resources of the Levantine sea 
basin. The outbreak of new prolonged 
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THE ROLE OF EGYPT AND THE U.S.
 The series of uprisings called the Arab 
Spring led to a reconfiguration of regional 
balances.36 The Egyptian uprising of 2011 
and the rise of Mohammed Morsi to 
leadership in Cairo posed questions about 
the sustainability of good relations among 
Egypt, Israel and Cyprus. As the Morsi 
government developed a close working 
relationship with Turkey, it decided not 
to take sides in the Greek-Turkish dispute 
over the delineation of maritime zones in 
the Eastern Mediterranean and refused to 
continue exploratory talks with Greece 
without the participation of Turkey. Signals 
were even given that the new government 
might consider annulling the bilateral 
agreement the Mubarak regime had signed 
with the Republic of Cyprus delineating the 
EEZs of the two states. In fact, a bill was 
submitted to the Egyptian lower house by a 
pro-government member of parliament for 
the abolition of that agreement.37
 Yet after the military coup of July 
3, 2013, the new Egyptian government 
distanced itself from Turkey. The sharp 
deterioration of Turkish-Egyptian relations 
in the aftermath of the coup had an impact 
on the question of delineation of the mari-
time borders in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
The virulent criticism of the coup by Prime 
Minister Erdogan contributed to a U-turn 
in Egyptian policy regarding maritime 
zones in the Eastern Mediterranean. The 
exploratory talks for the delineation of the 
Greek-Egyptian maritime zones, which 
were suspended following the rise to pow-
er of the Morsi government, were expected 
to resume following the September 2013 
meeting of Greek Foreign Minister Evan-
gelos Venizelos with his Egyptian coun-
terpart. This issue proved to be extremely 
sensitive, as the principles for the delinea-
tion of the Greek and Egyptian EEZs in 
hostilities between Israel and Hamas in the 
Gaza Strip in July 2014, the Israeli “Op-
eration Protective Edge” and the killing 
of hundreds of civilians brought Israeli-
Turkish relations to a new low, smashing 
any faint hopes for a rapprochement in the 
foreseeable future. 
THE ROLE OF THE EU
 The role of the European Union was 
also of primary importance. Greece and 
Cyprus are full members, while Turkey 
has been a candidate state since 1999 and 
in accession negotiations since October 
2005. The question of EU energy security 
is another primary variable.32 As the EU is 
looking to diversify its sources of natural 
gas, gaining access to Eastern Mediterra-
nean energy resources would be a welcome 
development from the security perspective 
and might even lead to the establishment of 
a new European energy corridor. 33 The EU 
could become a key supporter and sponsor 
of energy projects aimed at bringing Le-
vantine resources to the European market. 34
 This does not mean that the EU would 
support projects without a sound economic 
and political rationale. The European 
economic crisis has mitigated the demand 
for ever-growing quantities of natural gas. 
In addition, the discovery of new energy 
resources such as shale gas and the rising 
role of renewable energy resources have 
the potential to revolutionize energy mar-
kets and change market requirements. This 
would not mean that the EU would cease to 
be interested in energy projects. Yet it could 
mean that its interest and, in particular, its 
commitment to the financing of energy in-
frastructure and pipeline projects could not 
be independent of fundamental feasibility 
considerations. If the project made no sense 
economically, it would be highly unlikely 
that the EU would rescue it.35
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the Eastern Mediterranean could serve as 
precedents for the delineation of the Greek 
and Turkish EEZs in the same region. 
While it would be too early to predict how 
Egyptian-Turkish relations will unfold, the 
level of rapprochement achieved during 
the Muslim Brotherhood government was 
unrealistic.
 Meanwhile, the growing interest of the 
United States in energy exploration in the 
Eastern Mediterranean was not only due 
to the prospect of limiting Russia’s domi-
nant position in the European natural-gas 
market. It was also linked to the dramatic 
developments in the Syrian civil war and 
the Egyptian military coup. The Cyprus 
conflict and Turkey’s problematic relations 
with Israel limited the effectiveness of a 
U.S. policy response to the Arab uprisings. 
The seemingly intractable Cyprus conflict 
and the Israeli-Turkish animosity suddenly 
appeared easier to resolve than the crises 
that broke out in Syria and Egypt — to say 
nothing of the rapid deterioration of U.S.-
Russian relations over Ukraine. During 
his May 2014 visit to Cyprus, the highest-
level visit of a U.S. official to Cyprus since 
Lyndon Johnson’s in 1962, Vice President 
Joseph Biden stated that “Cyprus is poised 
to become a key player, ... transform-
ing the eastern Mediterranean into a new 
global hub for natural gas,” and pledged 
U.S. support for peace negotiations.38 Un-
locking the potential that the resolution of 
the Cyprus conflict and an Israeli-Turkish 
rapprochement would bring about in the 
Eastern Mediterranean rose higher on the 
U.S. foreign-policy agenda.
CONCLUSIONS
 While some of the initial estimates 
about the significance of discovering siz-
able energy resources under the seabed 
of the Eastern Mediterranean may prove 
to be grossly exaggerated, energy will 
continue to have a significant effect on 
the political economy of the region. It is 
still early to estimate the total size of the 
recoverable energy reserves. This crucial 
detail will be affected by the course of 
the world economy, the development of 
unconventional fossil fuels (e.g., shale gas) 
resource technology, and the proliferation 
of renewable energy. Overcoming the ob-
stacles of the Cyprus conflict, the delinea-
tion of the EEZs in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, the bitter Israeli-Turkish feud and 
the repercussions of the Arab uprisings 
requires the cooperative intervention of 
third parties. Whether a relative-gains 
or an absolute-gains approach prevails 
depends on success in multilateralizing the 
project of monetizing Levantine natural 
gas — on both the demand and the supply 
sides. Building trust in a region affected 
by chronic conflict among neighboring 
states is notoriously difficult. While there 
are very few organizations with a positive 
record in trust-building, one of them, the 
European Union, has long been involved 
in the question. Including all key parties 
— Cyprus, Greece, Israel and Turkey — 
and making the possible future inclusion 
of other littoral states — Lebanon, the 
Palestinian Authority and Syria — would 
facilitate a positive-sum game. Perhaps 
natural gas could power peace in the East-
ern Mediterranean.
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